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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Abbe Smith’s1 recent article, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal 
Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety about Innocence Projects,2 is deserving of spirited response.  
The article advances an important conversation about the philosophical compatibility of 
innocence projects3 with “guilty projects”–as she terms law school criminal defender clinics–and, 
more generally and perhaps more importantly, raises critical questions about the proper place of 
“innocence movements” within the field of criminal justice. 
Professor Smith’s approach in the article is not only provocative, but unique.  Most 
articles that have attempted to assess the value of innocence projects, the work that they perform,4 
and their relative place in the criminal justice system, have tended to take the form of an 
                                                          
 Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Mississippi Innocence Project and Innocence Clinic, University of 
Mississippi School of Law.  I thank my former professor, colleague, and good friend, Abbe Smith for provoking me; 
Bradley Hiatt for excellent research assistance; numerous members of the Innocence Network, as well as Professors 
Wallace J. Mlyniec and Desiree C. Hensley for their thoughtful additions to this conversation; John Grisham for his 
visionary generosity, and the University of Mississippi School of Law for its efforts toward making equal justice a reality 
for the State’s innocently condemned. 
1 Professor and Director of the Criminal Defense and Prisoner Advocacy Clinic, Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
2 Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety about 
Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315 (2010) [hereinafter Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project]. 
3 To date, there are at least seventy-seven innocence projects nationally, and nine internationally.  Other 
Projects Around the World, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Other-Projects.php (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
4 Both “innocence projects” and “the work that they do” vary according to their individual missions.  As I 
use the terms, I mean primarily those projects that undertake as their work, in part or in whole, the identification, 
investigation and litigation of valid claims of post-conviction innocence. 
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empirically-based back and forth.  Those in support of their value have marshaled empirical 
evidence of the successes–mostly exonerations–while those opposed have claimed that the 
innocence movement’s greatest triumph was its self-aggrandizing ability to exaggerate both its 
importance and the seriousness of the injustices it claimed to rectify.5 
Professor Smith begins her article by immediately conceding that there is now little 
debate about the impact of innocence work.  She readily acknowledges the power of DNA 
evidence to free the wrongly convicted and, in the process, to raise serious questions about certain 
fundamental conceptions in our criminal justice system.6  Almost all of these developments stem 
from the work of innocence projects or by lawyers who were working in the innocence movement 
tradition.  She notes that unlike virtually any other development in the field of criminal justice, the 
issue of innocent persons being convicted, perhaps even executed,7 for crimes that they did not 
commit contains, according to Professor Lawrence C. Marshall, an uncontested sense of righteous 
indignation that transcends virtually any partisan divide about issues of race or class that have 
historically revealed deep divisions in our national conversations.8  Popular culture has not only 
been exposed to, but has also been compelled by the development.  John Grisham recognized this 
phenomenon and wrote his first nonfiction book, The Innocent Man,9 about it. It immediately 
struck a popular nerve and became, like his fictionalized courtroom dramas, a best-seller. 
Professor Smith also readily concedes that the impact of innocence work is broader than 
discrete cases or popular culture.  She cites the work of a gubernatorially appointed commission’s 
investigation of the state of Illinois’ system of capital punishment that led Governor George Ryan 
to enact a moratorium on executions in 2003 that emptied that state’s death row of 167 of its 
condemned prisoners.10  In March of 2011, Illinois officially abolished its death penalty.11  
                                                          
5 See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1552 n.12 (2008) (referring to John 
McAdams’ argument that death penalty opponents have exaggerated the number of exonerated people by blurring the 
distinction between factual and legal innocence); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The 
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005). 
6 Mission Statement, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-
Statement.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (noting that, to date, 275 people have been exonerated in the United States 
through post-conviction DNA testing, seventeen of whom served time on death row). 
7 See David Grann, Trial by Fire, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42 (chronicling the case of Cameron 
Todd Willingham, who was executed for murdering his three children by arson.  After Willingham’s execution, the 
evidence used to prove the arson was found to be extremely faulty). 
8 Lawrence C. Marshall, Walter C. Reckless Memorial Lecture: The Innocence Revolution and the Death 
Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 577 (2004). 
9 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN (2006).  As Grisham 
tells the story, he was reading the obituary page of the New York Times one day and ran across an article about Ron 
Williamson, a former minor league baseball player who had been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death in Oklahoma 
for a rape and murder.  Not long after Williamson was freed, he died of health complications.  According to Grisham, who 
many would consider one of the pre-eminent tellers of popular fiction, “Never in my most creative moment could I have 
come up with a story like this.”  Michelle Norris, Grisham Traces Exoneration of an ‘Innocent Man,’ (NPR Oct. 11, 
2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6248147. 
10 See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 2003, at A10; COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
(2002), http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/summary_recommendations.pdf. 
11 Amendment to S.B. 3539, 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2010), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation 
/fulltext.asp?DocName=09600SB3539ham001&GA=96&SessionId=76&DocTypeId=SB&LegID=&DocNum=3539&GA
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Among the most important justifications for abolition is the significant number of condemned 
people on the State’s death row who were later shown to be innocent.12 
Professor Smith does not mention it explicitly, but the United States Supreme Court has 
recently given serious consideration to the question of whether an individual convicted of a crime 
has a constitutionally based claim to DNA testing.13  Though the Court did not ultimately 
recognize the right, Justice Stevens, argued in his dissent that the legitimacy of the claim could be 
based, among other places, in: 
. . . the fact that 46 States and the Federal Government have passed statutes providing 
access to evidence for DNA testing, and 3 additional states (including Alaska [where Petitioner 
was incarcerated]) provide similar access through court-made rules alone . . . . The fact that nearly 
all the States have now recognized some post-conviction right to DNA evidence makes it more, 
not less, appropriate to recognize a limited federal right to such evidence in cases where litigants 
are unfairly barred from obtaining relief in state court.14 
It is safe to say that the discussion at this level may never have occurred–or at least 
would not have occurred as soon as it did–but for the work of innocence projects and their 
advocacy.15 
Rather than focusing on precisely how the innocence movement’s impact ought to be 
measured, Professor Smith takes issue with the ultimate value of the impact itself.  In a sense, she 
questions the impact’s legacy by identifying three acute areas of concern: the movement’s belief 
in the supreme righteousness of its calling; its singular focus on innocence as the chief currency in 
criminal justice reform; and the popularity of innocence projects in law school curriculums to the 
exclusion of other clinical programs.16  Her ultimate concern is that these areas are not only 
defining characteristics, but at some basic level are in conflict with fundamental tenets of indigent 
                                                          
ID=10&Session. 
12 Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at A1. 
13 Dist. Att’ys Office for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).  Osborne, seeking relief 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, argued that the Due Process Clause grants a constitutional right to DNA evidence for testing.  Id. 
at 2315.  Accordingly, Osborne sought access to biological material for more modern DNA analysis.  Id.  Before the 
Osborne decision, other courts found a constitutional right to access DNA for testing.  E.g., McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. 
Supp. 2d 440, 491-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding a right to not suffer criminal sanctions due to prosecutorial deliberate 
indifference to the potential the individual is innocent and that “such deliberate indifference is expressed by a prosecutor’s 
refusal to allow access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing” when it could be done at a low cost and the 
results would show innocence beyond a reasonable doubt); Osborne v. Dist. Att’ys Office for Third Jud. Dist., 521 F.3d 
1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (“[W]e . . . hold that Osborne is entitled to assert . . . the due 
process right to post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence . . . .”).  More recently, in Skinner v. 
Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), the Court adhered to Osborne, ruling that there is no substantive due process right to such 
testing, but (and here the Osborne decision was silent) that a prisoner has a procedural due process right to post-conviction 
DNA testing.  Further, the Court reasoned that if Skinner’s suit for DNA testing was in fact successful, it would not 
“necessarily imply” the invalidity of his conviction.  Id. (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 (2004).  Though 
the results could possibly be exculpatory, they could also be inconclusive or validate his conviction.  Id.  Therefore, the 
claim could be brought in a § 1983 civil rights suit, and that suit would be cognizable in federal court.  Id. 
14 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2335 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
15 As a practical matter, the Innocence Project was on the brief, and Peter Neufeld, co-founder of the 
Innocence Project, participated in oral argument.  Brief for the Respondent, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6); Oral 
Argument at 1, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6). 
16 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 318 (“In this essay I will discuss three growing 
concerns about Innocent Projects . . .”). 
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criminal defense. 
I should say at the outset–partly in the interest of disclosure but also in the hope that it 
adds context and perspective to my critique–that I am a former student and colleague of Professor 
Smith’s.  We have been good friends for years and, maybe more importantly, have collaborated 
together as counsel on dozens of criminal cases.  It is for those reasons, as well as because she has 
for many years provided insightful commentary about indigent criminal defense work,17 that I 
take at face value her criticisms of innocence work.  In Praise of the Guilty Project identifies and 
adds to what I believe is–and ought to be–a candid conversation about the rightful place of, as 
another colleague and long-time clinician describes it simply, “the incredibly complex world of 
criminal defense.” 
That said, I do take issue with the article, and in particular with what I view as a singular 
problem that affects her entire argument.  It derives from the characteristic strength of both the 
article and her body of work: its keen insights into what it means to be a zealous advocate for the 
indigent criminally accused.  Put another way, as a long-time practicing defender and clinical 
teacher, Professor Smith struggles, as many long-time defenders have, with reconciling two areas 
of practice.  These areas, criminal defense and innocence work, have aspirations which appear to 
be twinned, but the methods of achieving them sometimes seem philosophically incompatible. 
More particularly, Professor Smith grounds her arguments in anecdote–or anecdotally-
based evidence in some instances–and not in empirical evidence.  As a general matter there is 
nothing wrong with this approach.  In fact, the article’s discursive quality accounts for its 
readability and ease with which it can enter into this important overarching and ongoing 
discussion.  However, the article’s critical flaw is not one of identification so much as it is of 
attribution.  Professor Smith has constructed various straw men to stand in place for her lack of 
empirical evidence and tends to attribute characteristics to the movement that are in actuality only 
aberrant incidents. 
The concerns that she attributes to the innocence movement are legitimate, but they do 
not derive from the DNA of the movement, as it were, or from innocence work more precisely.  
Instead, I believe that they are more accurately classified as the by-product of two kinds of 
tension.  The first is the internal tension arising from within the innocence movement itself.  I 
would describe it as a symptom of a serious–and seriously successful–development in the field of 
criminal justice that is not yet comfortable in its own skin.  The second is the tension that arises 
from the interaction of the innocence movement and other players in the criminal justice system–
primarily defenders and prosecutors–virtually all of whom have been around far longer than 
innocence advocates.  These players’ rules and codes of behavior–many of which work and work 
well–collide with innocence practitioners’ positions that don’t fit into traditional, or sometimes 
even recognizable, categories of advocacy.  What Professor Smith is absolutely correct about, 
however, and what makes her article such an important contribution, is that to some extent the 
innocence movement has yet to win the hearts and minds of some in the criminal defense 
community.  The ability of innocence projects separately, or together as a collective body known 
                                                          
17 See ABBE SMITH, CASE OF A LIFETIME: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER’S STORY (2008); Abbe Smith, 
The Lawyer’s “Conscience” and the Limits of Persuasion, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 479 (2007); Abbe Smith, The Burdens of 
Representing the Accused in an Age of Harsh Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451 (2004); Abbe 
Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public 
Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Too Much Heart]; Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: 
The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000) [hereinafter 
Smith, Defending]. 
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as the innocence movement, to reconcile these tensions likely holds the answer to the ultimate 
legacy of the “new civil rights movement of the twenty-first century.”18 
I. A PERSONAL STORY 
I was recently involved in a case that illustrates precisely these tensions.  A couple of 
years ago I was asked to represent a criminal defendant in a Louisiana parish not far from New 
Orleans.  My client, along with two co-defendants, was charged with murder.  This was to be a re-
trial.  All three had been convicted of murder in 1993 and each had been sentenced to serve life in 
prison at Angola, Louisiana’s state penitentiary.19  Based on newly discovered evidence, an 
appellate court had reversed their convictions in 2008.20 
The specific facts of the case are complicated and mostly beside the point, but there are 
two aspects that are relevant to this story: the first is that all of the defendants were factually 
innocent; the second is that when I was asked to join as counsel I had recently become the director 
of the Mississippi Innocence Project based at the University of Mississippi School of Law.  
Immediately prior to that I had been a trial lawyer at the Public Defender Service in Washington, 
D.C.  In other words, I had gone from one of Professor Smith’s “guilty projects” directly to an 
innocence project.21 
At the first hearing in the case after my appointment, the judge asked all the parties to 
retire to chambers to discuss the upcoming retrial.  Not surprisingly the judge, who seemed like a 
consummate pragmatist, wanted to discuss the possibility of disposing of the case short of trial.  
He made clear that he thought that serious consideration ought to be given to working out a 
solution.  He had presided over some of the hearings where defense attorneys had presented 
evidence of law enforcement malfeasance and our clients’ non-involvement, and my impression 
was that he may have felt that after spending over a decade and a half in prison, the State might be 
satisfied in thinking that it had exacted its pound of flesh. 
The lead prosecutor, an experienced, senior attorney from the district attorney’s office, 
reacted slightly differently to the judge’s urging.  He immediately seized the opportunity to offer 
what he viewed was his eminent reasonableness: notwithstanding the State’s earlier successful 
effort to convict all of the defendants, he would entertain a deal for the first of the defendants to 
help the prosecution in its case–presumably by agreeing to testify against the other two co-
defendants. 
When the prosecutor announced his position there was a pregnant pause, after which one 
                                                          
18 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 317 (quoting Press Release, Innocence Project, As 
100th Innocent Prisoner is Freed by DNA Tests, Innocence Network Convenes to Map the Future of “New Civil Rights 
Movement” in Criminal Justice (Jan. 17, 2002), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-project-press-release-100th-
innocent-prisoner-freed-dna-tests-innocence-network-convenes-m). 
19 See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211-12 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the conditions at Angola 
violate the Eighth Amendment); Special Master’s Report at 313, Williams v. McKeithen, No. 71-CV-98 (M.D. La. Apr. 
28, 1975), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-LA-0001-0001.pdf; ANNE BUTLER & C. MURRAY 
HENDERSON, ANGOLA: LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY A HALF CENTURY OF RAGE AND REFORM (1995). 
20 Paul Purpura, Duo Jailed Since ‘92 Due Out on Bond–Men Will be Retried in Westwego Killing, THE 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 20, 2008, http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/westbank/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1221888616317830. 
xml&coll=1. 
21 I had spent two years supervising and teaching post-graduate fellows and third-year clinic students at 
Georgetown University Law Center who were assigned misdemeanors and low-level felonies in D.C. Superior Court. 
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of my co-counsel tried his best to remind the prosecutor that the primary reason we were all 
sitting where we were, with our clients out on bail pending a re-trial, was because the vast 
majority of the newly-discovered evidence supported the fact that all of the defendants were 
innocent.  This colleague then recounted a couple of the more compelling pieces of that evidence 
and suggested that the prosecutor engage in a wholesale reassessment of the case. 
What the prosecutor heard was that his case was weak, the defense’s strong, and not 
wanting to waste any more of his time, acted right out of central casting.  “Let’s just try the case 
then,” he said. 
At which point I spoke up. 
I suggested to the prosecutor that perhaps the typical approach to negotiating a criminal 
case was unlikely to advance us toward any sort of satisfactory resolution.  Perhaps, I said as 
reasonably as I could, we explore some other avenue. 
I did so with several reservations, however.  For one thing, I relished the opportunity to 
go to trial.  It had been a while since I had tried a case.  My two colleagues were terrific, skilled 
lawyers, and a lot of fun besides.  My client was a pleasure to work with and represent.  We had a 
compelling case.  An acquittal would have been even more gratifying than usual in that it would 
have also sent a message about the depth of the systemic malfeasance and failure of justice visited 
on our clients. 
On the other hand, the parish is a notoriously difficult one for criminal defendants – 
especially African-American defendants like ours.22 This particular parish has a history of 
supporting white supremacists for national office23 and most recently made a name for itself by 
forming armed citizen posses and setting up barricades to prevent New Orleanians fleeing their 
Katrina-flooded city from making it across the river and into their parish.24  Our clients had been 
indicted by an all-white grand jury, which had been selected by a method that was racially biased 
and in violation of the state and federal constitutions.25  What’s more, it’s one of the few 
jurisdictions in the country that allow for non-unanimous jury verdicts in certain cases.26  Our 
                                                          
22 Jeffrey Gettleman, Prosecutors’ Morbid Neckties Stir Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at A14 
(investigating the “racially tinged, bloodthirsty culture” in Jefferson Parish as evidenced by prosecutors wearing neckties 
depicting nooses and the Grim Reaper in addition to distributing plaques affixed with hypodermic needles for each lethal 
injection). 
23 See TYLER BRIDGES, THE RISE OF DAVID DUKE (1995) (chronicling the career of David Duke, a former 
Ku Klux Klan grand wizard who became a Louisiana House Representative). 
24 See Adam Nossiter, Harry Lee, 75, Outspoken Louisiana Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at B6. 
25 State v. Jacobs, 13 So. 3d 677, 683 (La. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 32 So. 3d 227 (La. 2010). 
26 Paul Purpura, U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Consider Non-unanimous Jury Verdicts, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Oct. 5, 2009, www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2009/10/us_supreme_court_declines_to_c.html (“Louisiana and Oregon are 
the only states that allow convictions based on juries that are unanimous in reaching verdicts.  Both states require at least 
10 or 12 jurors to agree in order to convict.”).  See State v. Lee, 964 So. 2d 967, 973 (La. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 130 (2008); State v. Bowen, 168 P.3d 1208, 1209 (Or. 2007), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009).  See also 
Michael H. Glasser, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 659, 661 (1997). It is clear that juries in Oregon state courts are using non-unanimous decisions with frequency. OR. 
OFF. OF PUB. DEF. SERV. APP. DIV., ON THE FREQUENCY OF NON-UNANIMOUS FELONY VERDICTS IN OREGON: A 
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE OREGON PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES COMMISSION 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/Reports/PDSCReportNonUnanJuries.pdf?ga=t. See generally Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 
U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (holding that a conviction of a crime by less than an unanimous jury does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of right to trial by jury as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972) (holding that conviction by a non-unanimous jury can satisfy the burden of proving 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol15/iss1/2
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clients had already spent the better part of their lives locked up at one of this country’s most 
notorious prisons; they did not relish the possibility of going back. 
I was also aware of a number of additional issues that would stand in the way of an 
amicable solution.  On the one hand, the prosecution had some portion of its office’s 
professionalism at stake, in particular the professional reputation of one of its longest-serving 
detectives who, during the original investigation, failed to track down leads when they pointed to 
a suspect other than our three clients.  On the other hand, the defendants, after spending almost 
two decades incarcerated for a crime that they did not commit, were hoping for an outright 
acquittal so that they could salvage the remainder of their lives.  An official exoneration also 
increased the chances that they would be eligible for monetary compensation.27  To make matters 
more difficult still, the case had assumed a fair amount of publicity, especially during the post-
trial hearings where serious doubts about the defendants’ involvement were being raised and the 
prosecution’s malfeasance exposed. 
My single biggest reservation was that I could not immediately offer any workable 
result, much less a path to get there.  The more I spoke about the need for an alternative approach, 
the harder I had to work to avoid sounding either like the kind of innocence advocate whose 
position the prosecutor was failing to hear, or the worst kind of accommodationist whose solution 
results in neither party being able to claim that justice has been done.  In the end, about the only 
thing that my efforts to bridge the gap seemed to accomplish was bringing the meeting to an 
abrupt end with nothing settled, other than a perfunctory promise to the judge that all the parties 
would continue to consider various options. 
As the meeting broke up, it occurred to me that my colleagues might have been 
disappointed in me.  I felt like I had let down our side to some degree by attempting to engage 
with the prosecutor after they had tried to make it clear that the engagement should only be on 
terms that recognized explicitly the possibility of the defendants’ innocence.  They had lived with 
the cases significantly longer than I had – for years, really – and so they had much more invested 
in what we all agreed should be the correct outcome.  Good colleagues that they are, though, they 
winked at me in solidarity as I held the door open on the way out of the judge’s chambers. 
Last out was the prosecutor who waylaid me for a moment and mentioned, sotto voce, 
that he could tell that I wasn’t like all of the other innocence project people – I was not a “zealot” 
in his words – and he sincerely believed that my attitude might allow the two of us to work 
together to reach a solution.  He even draped an arm around my shoulder in a rather awkward and 
forced show of cross-cultural solidarity. 
He gestured for me to go ahead, which seemed appropriate – stranded as I was between 
two camps.  I was new to innocence work, to what it meant, and still trying to find my rightful 
                                                          
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Robert Buckhout, et al., Jury Verdicts: Comparison of 6- vs. 12-Person Juries and 
Unanimous vs. Majority Decision Rule in a Murder Trial, 10 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 175, 175 (1977) (finding that 
the nonunanimous jury is much more likely to convict that the unanimous jury). Since Apodaca and Johnson, the Supreme 
Court has refused to revisit the issue. 
27 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572.8 (2009).  At time of publication, twenty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia have compensation laws for exonerees. After Exoneration, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.org/know/After-Exoneration.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2011); Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Compensating_The_Wrongly_Convicted.php# (last visited Sept. 10, 
2011).  See generally THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 
ENDURE AND HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
docs/Innocence_Project_Compensation_Report.pdf (detailing the obstacles to reintegration and monetary compensation 
for exonerees). 
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place. 
II. THE “ARROGANCE OF INNOCENCE”28 
Professor Smith’s first critique of the innocence movement is directed at what she 
perceives as the innocence movement’s belief in the “superiority” of its mission.29  According to 
her, this superiority frequently takes the form of an attitude of “one-upmanship”30 that trumpets 
the perceived moral primacy of the work.31  Her initial concern is that this attitude leads to a 
distorted and self-aggrandizing value system, one that is primarily concerned with advancing the 
work’s image rather than with addressing the larger systemic issues that underlie wrongful 
convictions.  As anecdotal evidence Professor Smith points to an e-mail flyer disseminated by an 
innocence project.  Not only did the flyer herald the importance of the work, it also took pains to 
make sure that a reader understood that freeing the innocent did not mean helping “guilty inmates 
lessen their sentences or get off on technicalities.”32 
Professor Smith found the message objectionable for two reasons.  First, she believes 
that the use of the word “technicalities” as a term-of-art denigrates landmark cases like Miranda 
v. Arizona,33 Brady v. Maryland,34 or Strickland v. Washington,35 and the critical protections that 
they offer the criminally accused.  Second, the message seemed to her to ignore the fact that those 
same protections are sometimes used as tools by innocence practitioners themselves to expose 
false confessions, unearth exculpatory evidence, or highlight a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, all of which are root causes of many wrongful convictions.36 
My first reaction to this portion of her critique is to agree with her.  Miranda, Brady and 
Strickland are not based on “technicalities.”  I would quickly note, though, that in my experience 
the pejorative use of the term “technicality” in the e-mail flyer is an aberration, and that this 
sentiment among innocence practitioners is not widely shared, if shared at all.  But her critique 
and my reaction risk missing what I think is a larger point: almost without exception all innocence 
projects take as the foremost part of their mission the identification and litigation of viable claims 
of innocence.37  That seems like an obvious point, but it is an important one to recognize and also 
                                                          
28 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 319. 
29 Id. at 320. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 321-22 (“But there is also an arrogance to the ‘innocentrism’ of the innocent movement. They are 
the righteous ones, the virtuous ones.”). 
32 Id. at 319. 
33 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding that statements obtained during interrogation 
without a full warning of their constitutional rights are inadmissible). 
34 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that prosecution’s withholding of exculpatory 
evidence material to guilt or punishment violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
35 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of 
counsel is a guarantee of effective counsel). 
36 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 320; Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2011).  See also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 87, 96-97 (2008) 
(analyzing the types of criminal procedure claims brought by exonerees). 
37 “The Innocence Network is an affiliation of organizations dedicated to providing pro bono legal and 
investigative services to individuals seeking to prove innocence of crimes for which they have been convicted and working 
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one that criminal defense lawyers tend to misapprehend because it can seem professionally 
counter-intuitive.  I can readily sympathize with their sense of cognitive dissonance, but would 
suggest that like any successful litigation tactic, context is everything. 
For innocence advocates, violations of Miranda, Brady and Strickland are always 
important, but as they relate to innocence work they are relevant only insofar as they give rise to a 
claim of actual innocence.38  In other words, a due process violation – even an egregious one – 
that offends the body of law for which those cases stand does not necessarily mean that the case is 
a viable one for innocence projects to pursue unless the client is also factually innocent.  Or, put 
another way, addressing the systemic problems that Professor Smith rightly complains about, and 
that are also sometimes the cause of many wrongful convictions, is not necessarily the concern of 
innocence projects in the first instance unless and until their client can be shown to be factually 
innocent. 
Before moving on to what I believe to be the most important thrust of Professor Smith’s 
point about the arrogance of innocence work, I have two other brief observations to make that 
sharpen my reaction to her concern.  The innocence movement, consistent with its values and 
what it believes to be the overriding needs of its putative clients, does not put up many obstacles 
for individuals or entities that want to declare innocence work as their professional purpose.39  It 
should hardly come as a surprise that individuals may occasionally use the fact that they pursue 
the work as evidence of the work’s, and their own, moral superiority.40  Secondly, there are 
several other groups whose focus is the freeing of wrongfully incarcerated individuals and who do 
not have a single attorney or policy person on staff.  They do not therefore make it their primary 
concern – or in some cases, a concern at all – to address overarching issues of criminal justice 
policy.  These groups’ primary concern is to free the innocently incarcerated.  They have done 
excellent, and in many instances, groundbreaking work.41 
                                                          
to redress the causes of wrongful convictions.” About the Innocence Network, THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, 
http://www.innocencenetwork.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
38 Note that as far as identified “causes” are concerned, there are no statistics for Miranda, Brady and 
Strickland.  Instead, the statistics that are mentioned most often as being the leading causes of wrongful convictions are 
eyewitness identification errors, false confessions and prosecutorial or law enforcement misconduct. See, e.g., Sommer 
Ingram, Bill to Reduce Wrong Convictions Passes Committee, KILLEEN DAILY HERALD, Feb. 22, 2011, 
http://www.kdhnews.com/news/story.aspx?s=51380 (noting that Texas lawmakers, in a reaction to being the nation’s 
leader in exonerations, have created a bill to amend eyewitness identification procedures to respond to the 
misidentification problem); see also Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2011) (explaining 
that eyewitness misidentification is the most common cause of wrongful convictions in the United States). 
39 Among the basic qualifying criteria for membership in the Innocence Network, an applicant innocence 
project must demonstrate the following: the organization provides pro bono legal and/or investigative services to 
individuals seeking to prove their innocence of crimes for which they have been convicted; the organization is a tax 
exempt organization; and that the organization is housed within, or sponsored by, a nonprofit organization or educational 
institution.  How to Join, THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/join.html (last visited Sept. 10, 
2011). 
40 I have spent significant time with all of the groups – defenders, innocence practitioners, and clinicians -- 
referenced in this portion of the critique.  Suffice it to say that innocence practitioners have not yet cornered the market on 
pomposity. 
41 Centurion Ministries, for example, whose stated mission is to vindicate and free from prison those who 
are completely innocent of the crimes for which they have been unjustly convicted for life or death.  See CENTURION 
MINISTRIES, http://www.centurionministries.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).   One such exoneration was of Elmer 
“Geronimo” Platt. Pratt, a leader of the Los Angeles Black Panther Party in the 1960’s, was convicted of murder after the 
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Professor Smith’s primary worry is what she terms the “innocentrism”42 of the 
movement.  As she uses the term of art, she means the belief of innocence practitioners that they 
“are the righteous ones, the virtuous ones.”43  More specifically, she contrasts criminal defense 
attorneys like herself, who are ethically bound to pursue their clients’ interests “(even if that client 
is guilty)”44 and who owe that client an unalloyed duty of responsibility, with innocence 
practitioners who act as though their calling is somehow higher because they must “look[ ] after 
everyone in the system.”45 
Though Professor Smith never says as much explicitly, I believe that at its most 
fundamental level her concern about the “innocentrism” of innocence work boils down to the fear 
that “innocentrism” threatens – mostly by failing to fulfill – what she would consider to be the 
central ethos required of those who commit themselves to defending poor people charged with 
criminal conduct.  In practical terms I think her critique asks whether there are tensions, some of 
which may implicate ethical conduct, that arise in pursuing innocence work if that work is seen to 
require trying to “look after” more than your single client.  If there are, and if innocence 
practitioners engage in that effort, how do they, she seems to ask, remain the kind of lawyers that 
she and other commentators have consistently claimed is necessary in this type of practice – the 
kind who represent their clients with utmost “devotion and zeal.”46 
In parsing her concern, it is worth noting as a preliminary matter that there is no ethical 
prohibition against representing individual clients who have legal issues that may relate to a larger 
cause for which the lawyer may be an advocate.  Advocacy groups have been engaged in this 
work for generations, and the Supreme Court itself has spoken to the propriety of the work.47  Not 
only is this type of zeal permitted, but it is also, at least when it’s mentioned in the same breath as 
criminal defense, usually followed by a lament for how little of it there is.48  In my experience, 
                                                          
FBI vowed to neutralize him. After twenty-seven years in prison, Pratt was ordered a new trial and exonerated after the 
state’s primary witness was found to be an FBI and LAPD informant who had lied at trial. Cases, CENTURION MINISTRIES, 
http://www.centurionministries.org/cases/elmer-geranimo-pratt/index.php (last visited Oct.30, 2011). Another exoneree is 
Edward Honaker. After Centurion’s DNA testing proved Honaker’s innocence despite two erroneous eye-witness  
identifications, Honaker was pardoned by Virginia’s Governor in 1994 after serving ten years of two life sentences. Cases, 
CENTURION MINISTRIES, http://www.centurionministries.org/cases/edward-honaker/index.php (last visited Oct.30, 2011). 
42 Professor Smith did not coin the term herself.  Instead she adopts it from an article by the same name 
whose author Professor Daniel Medwed, himself an innocence practitioner, writes that, rather than being a hindrance to 
the progression of procedural and substantive criminal law, the burgeoning focus on innocence complements that work. 
See Medwed, supra note 5, at 1549. 
43 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 321. 
44 Id. at 322. 
45 Id.  Interestingly, in an interview done by Institute of International Studies at University of California, 
Berkeley, Peter Neufeld has this to say about his view of innocence litigation: “I think of our innocence cases as civil 
rights cases, as much as they are criminal defense cases.”  See Interview by Harry Kreisler with Peter Neufeld, Co-
Founder, The Innocence Project, Benjamin Cardoza Sch. of Law, Yeshiva Univ., in Berkeley, Ca. (Apr. 27, 2001), 
available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Neufeld/neufeld-con0.html. 
46 See COMM. ON CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF COMM. ON CODE OF 
PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 15, at 579 (1908) (referring to the lawyer’s obligation to give “‘entire devotion to the interest of the 
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of [the lawyer’s] utmost learning and 
ability”). 
47 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (finding unconstitutional Virginia statutes outlawing 
certain legal solicitation practices that N.A.A.C.P. lawyers were using to advocate for equal rights). 
48 See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol15/iss1/2
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lack of zeal underlies virtually every wrongful conviction, even those that feature more typical 
root causes, such as eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, and prosecutorial and law 
enforcement malfeasance.49  If it can be said that innocence practitioners’ efforts are directed in 
part to remedy previous representational or systemic shortcomings, then it stands to reason that 
“looking after” more than one’s client would appear to be a problem with zeal–though with too 
much of it, rather than not enough. 
At the risk of being overly-anecdotal, I offer this about the issue of zeal as it affects 
innocence work: every year there is a moment at the national innocence project conference during 
which a large number of exonerees, including many of those released during the prior calendar 
year, appear together to be recognized by all of the conference attendees.  The aggregate suffering 
experienced by that group, mixed with the complex joy of their new freedom and multiplied out 
for their families and the victims and their families50, is impossible to quantify.  I have witnessed 
it several times now, and I never cease to be deeply moved.  If we all agree with Blackstone’s 
proposition that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer,”51 then 
the freeing of dozens upon dozens of innocent people who have been victimized by a system 
which purports to value constitutional guarantees over “public safety,” or even the truth, is a 
powerful thing.  I can attest to the fact that there is no sweeter sound than a “not guilty” verdict 
for defense lawyer and client.52  I can also attest that there is something equally potent and yet 
also profoundly different when the “not guilty” verdict is delivered decades later for a post-
                                                          
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996) (exploring larger issues plaguing the jury system and adversarial process through the 
O.J. Simpson criminal case); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993) (arguing 
that legal ethics should allow defense attorneys to aggressively defend their clients in all cases); Abbe Smith, The 
Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, 
Difference in Criminal Defense] (proclaiming that the zealous representation of a criminal defender is preferable); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (1995) (explaining the 
tension between the lawyer’s role in promoting client interests and maintaining professional responsibility). 
49 This colloquy between trial judge and defense attorney in a recent Mississippi murder case is illustrative, 
and in no way aberrant.  The defendant was charged with murder and, during the course of his arrest, made an un-
Mirandized statement to law enforcement.  The following conversation took place when the prosecution announced its 
intent to introduce the statement at trial: 
BY THE COURT: Do you have an objection? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. 
BY THE COURT: What’s your objection? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It would be just to object to the admissibility, Judge. 
BY THE COURT: You’ve got to give me a reason. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Uh -- we withdraw the objection, Judge. 
Transcript, State v. Gore, No. 08-CR-050-SC-G, slip op. at 61 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 6, 2008). 
50 Victims’ reactions to exonerations are understandably complex.  However, in slightly over one-third of 
post-conviction DNA exonerations the true perpetrator has been discovered, a development that is by definition of 
significant import to victims and various advocacy positions for which they may advocate. Press Release, Innocent 
Project, Proven Innocent by DNA, Roy Brown Is Fully Exonerated: Case Highlights Need for NY Innocence Commission 
(Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Proven_Innocent_by_DNA_Roy_Brown_Is_Fully_ Exonerated. 
php. 
51 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
52 Abbe Smith, Defending the Unpopular Down-Under, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 495, 546 (2006). 
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conviction innocence client. It is a qualitatively different experience because of what it indicates 
about long-held truisms regarding the quality and fairness of our criminal justice system. 
Among those indications is what I consider to be the innocence movement’s nearly 
singular ability to expose definitively the pervasive systemic injustice that infects the criminal 
justice system.  Unlike a “not guilty” verdict, which allows space for disagreement about the 
delivery of justice, exonerations, especially those that result from post-conviction DNA testing, 
provide irrefutable proof of institutionally condoned injustice.53  In some cases, the failures are the 
result of malfeasance; in others, the cause is some routinized and seemingly benign and ingrained 
habit of practice or procedure.  In either case, however, the cause is immaterial to the depth of the 
tragedy.  Exonerations, of course, are only the tip of the iceberg.  For every mistaken eyewitness 
identification that can be verified and developed into an innocence case, there are numerous 
others that suffer from the same faulty evidence but which, because there is no DNA, or it has 
been lost or degraded, or witnesses have died or gone missing, cannot be similarly developed.54 
Equally compelling is the fact that innocence cases expose appellate courts’ inability, 
even sometimes seeming unwillingness, to identify colorable claims of actual innocence or 
seriously address their root causes.  As early as 1993 in Herrera v. Collins55 the Supreme Court 
rejected an opportunity to find unconstitutional the execution of an innocent person who had 
received a full and fair trial.56  In fact, in her concurrence, Justice O’Connor wrote that “[o]ur 
society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials.”57  It has been a mere decade and a 
half since Herrera was decided and Justice O’Connor wrote those words.  What seemed then, at 
any rate, to be a defensible interpretation of the Constitution paired with an unscientific but 
nevertheless popular conception of public sentiment, now seems quaint, at best, and if placed 
against empirical evidence of innocence work, more like a ham-handed effort at creating plausible 
deniability. 
Based on an exhaustive study of the first two hundred reported cases of post-conviction 
DNA exonerations, Professor Brandon Garrett found that although the petitioners were innocent, 
few actually presented the claim as one of actual innocence because that claim, according to 
                                                          
53 It should be noted, however, that in some cases there are disagreements, usually between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys, as to what constitutes an actual exoneration.  See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Exonerated by DNA, Guilty in 
Official’s Eyes; High Court Hopeful’s View Troubles Critics, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 2007, at C4 (“In most of the cases 
where prosecutors have refused to believe in an exoneration, they have cited evidence that more than one person was 
involved in the crime to argue that the DNA was left by a second, unidentified offender.”). 
54 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that showing a defendant’s innocence does not 
entitle that defendant to federal habeas relief); Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False 
Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927 (2008) (exploring 
the challenge of acquiring accurate data regarding false convictions and its impact on capital cases); D. Michael Risinger, 
Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) 
(explaining the inaccuracy of the current wrongful conviction rate and the policy repercussions that arise as a result as well 
as proposing a remedy to this issue through using 1980’s capital rape convictions data); Clarence Page, The 200th Reason 
to Test DNA, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2007, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-04-25/news/0704240608_1_dna-
evidence-innocence-project-exonerated (proposing that DNA testing must be more widely used in the criminal justice 
system). 
55 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 390. 
56 Id. at 417 (noting, too, that even if such a claim were to exist, the threshold would be “extraordinarily 
high”). 
57 Id. at 420 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Herrera, is not cognizable.58  As a result, according to Garrett’s data, appellate claims do not 
privilege factual claims or their development.59  Of the 200 innocence cases examined, not a 
single case granted relief based on a challenge to an eyewitness identification error or a 
constitutional claim of forensic evidence problems.  Of those who falsely confessed, only half 
raised claims about the issue, and none received relief.60 
In sum, innocence work has succeeded unlike any other reformist movement in 
demonstrating just how profoundly certain inequities are built into the practical structure and 
doctrine of our criminal justice system itself.61  Even though efforts have been made to excise race 
and class from the criminal trial process, in large measure through Supreme Court cases like 
Gideon v. Wainwright62 and the jurisprudence that is meant to fulfill Gideon’s promise,63 the same 
fundamental inequalities still exist. 
Compounding the problem, most are now insulated from criticism or legal challenge 
because Justice O’Connor’s pronouncement not only still holds sway, but has metastasized.  
Justice Scalia, for example, has written recently that, 
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a 
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince 
a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have 
repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt 
that any claim based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally 
cognizable.64 
Were that not enough, he pointed out in a subsequent opinion, without any empirical or other 
support save his bombast, that “[o]ne cannot have a system of criminal punishment without 
accepting the possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly . . . . But with regard to the 
punishment of death in the current American system, that possibility has been reduced to an 
                                                          
58 Professor Garrett notes that there are avenues of relief based on “collateral” claims of innocence or on 
certain states’ constitutional protections. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 77 (2008).  See  
Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108, 1132 (Conn. 1997) (providing relief in case where “clear and convincing 
evidence” of actual innocence is present); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Ill. 1996) (finding that a 
legitimate claim of innocence raises due process issues under state constitution); Garrett, supra, at 110 n.200-201 (citing 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)) (determining that a Brady violation is premised upon a factual proffer 
showing that the exculpatory evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict”). 
59 Garrett, supra note 58, at 126 (providing a more in-depth discussion of the valuing of procedural claims 
over factual claims as it applies to innocence cases).  See generally William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37-45 (1997) (discussing the “defense attorneys’ incentive to 
skew their investment in the direction of more constitutional litigation and less litigation about the facts”). 
60 Garrett, supra note 58, at 60-61. 
61 See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1999). 
62 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that state courts must provide counsel in criminal cases for defendants not 
able to afford an attorney). 
63 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that state prosecutors cannot use peremptory 
challenges to exclude jurors based on their race); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing two-part 
test for claim of in effective counsel). 
64 In re Davis, 130 S.Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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insignificant minimum.”65 
I find Justice Scalia’s views, and likely a majority of the Court’s, patently offensive for 
any number of reasons. But chief among them is that it simply flies in the face of what has been 
true in my experience as a public defender, post-conviction lawyer, and director of an innocence 
project; as well as what has been made clear through the work of innocence projects.  I cared 
deeply about these issues when I was a public defender to the extent that I could challenge the 
problems on a case-by-case basis and only to the extent that they were relevant to a particular 
discrete client. 
My current job is by definition different.  The mission statement of the project that I 
direct explicitly states identifying and offering solutions to systemic problems in the State’s 
criminal justice system as one of its goals.  To my way of thinking, this is as it should be.  In a job 
where I have the luxury of a low caseload, where I can to some extent pick and choose cases 
based on their merit and likelihood of success, and where I can indubitably identify the cases that 
lead to wrongful convictions, I have two choices broadly speaking: to help only my clients, or to 
offer some help to everyone in the system.  Put another way, I can assure myself a job in 
perpetuity, or I can devote part of each workday to eventually working myself out of a job.  I 
choose the latter. 
I am not unaware that ethical conundrums arise when one engages simultaneously in the 
representation of individual clients and in the pursuit of policy work that flows directly from those 
cases.  But I would submit that whatever ethical issues arise are not so serious as to render the 
dual pursuit untenable.  Many of the innocence lawyers with whom I am best acquainted are 
hyper-aware of the particular ethical difficulties that arise as one tries both to be a lawyer for a 
discrete client and an advocate for a larger cause.  Almost all of the others, many of whom are 
new to the work, are keen to be made aware.  The Innocence Network itself has recently 
capitalized on the existing scholarship on these issues66 to develop a set of ethical and best 
practice standards for innocence practitioners.67  Compliance with some of the rules and 
regulations are prerequisites for membership in the Network; others are meant to flag and provide 
basic ethical and best practices guidance in certain situations frequently encountered in this 
practice.  To answer Professor Smith, the fact that a group of innocence practitioners felt they 
were a small enough subset of lawyers that they needed to devise their own set of professional 
standards is, I suppose, an act of some hubris.  The fact that they have been proactive about 
holding themselves accountable, in my view, is an equally striking act of humility. 
III. INNOCENCE AS THE CURRENCY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
Professor Smith’s second concern is that the attention and emphasis given over to the 
                                                          
65 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
66 See Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of Innocence Projects in 
Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 1101 (2006); Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in 
Selecting Cases for a New Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1097 (2002-2003).  See generally Jan Stiglitz et al., The 
Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects New Emerging Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 413 (2001-2002) (explaining the place that innocence projects have in legal education and in legal practice); Ellen 
Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for Innocence Projects: An Initial Primer, 70 UMKC L. REV. 921 (2002) (explaining the 
importance of innocence projects to adhere to ethical standards of practice in order to be effective). 
67 THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, GUIDE TO ETHICS & BEST PRACTICES FOR INNOCENCE PROJECT 
PRACTITIONERS (on file with author). 
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plight of the innocently incarcerated may result, intentionally or not, in affirmative indicia of 
innocence becoming the sine qua non of criminal trials–a tectonic burden shifting, as it were.  
Various iterations of this complaint have been around for years; they tend to be chimeric and 
oversimplified. 
My initial exposure to the phenomenon came through a case that a colleague of mine at 
the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C. tried in which the defendant had been charged 
with a purse snatching.  The incident had occurred on a busy street during the lunch hour.  The 
victim’s description of the perpetrator was strong, and the defendant was apprehended several 
blocks away in possession of the purse.  As best he could, my colleague tried to exploit the 
inconsistencies between the victim’s descriptions of the perpetrator and his actual appearance.  Of 
some help to the defense was that for several minutes the perpetrator had been out of everyone’s 
sight, offering the possibility, however slight, that his client may have innocently come into 
possession of the purse after the real perpetrator abandoned it.68  The theory was a stretch, to be 
sure.  After only a few minutes of deliberation, however, the jury returned with a “not guilty” 
verdict.  In a brief meeting between the lawyers and the jury after the trial was over, the jury 
explained that their verdict had been based in part on the fact that the defendant’s DNA had not 
been found on the purse, a fact that neither side had made any mention of one way or the other. 
For some period of time after that, there seemed to be ubiquitous complaints, advanced 
mostly by prosecutors at that point, but now seeping into the defense community, about the so-
called “CSI Effect”: the belief that absent proof as solid as a DNA match, juries would believe 
that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden.69  That concern appears to have dissipated 
prosecutorial efforts to disabuse juries of the misperception that crimes scenes are commonly 
awash in testable DNA evidence – that garden-variety property crimes like purse snatchings and 
auto thefts are hardly the kinds of cases to which law enforcement dispatch their CSI experts. 
That would seem to be that the case, except for the fact that in the years since the purse 
snatching case that I witnessed, DNA technology has advanced to a point where law enforcement 
can now bring these advancements to bear in routine and previously “un-solvable cases.”  Not 
only have new technologies been used in high profile cases – like the use of “touch” DNA to 
investigate the JonBenet Ramsay murder, for example70 – but also in ubiquitous pedestrian crimes 
like property offenses and auto thefts.71  Statistics from the National Institute of Justice indicate 
                                                          
68 According to singer-songwriter Randy Newman, there is some factual precedent for the claim.  Just before 
Newman performs his song “Naked Man,” he introduces it by telling the inspiration-producing story behind it.  According 
to Newman, a New Orleans public defender once represented a man accused of stealing a woman’s purse.  The man was 
naked when he was apprehended.  His defense was an alibi.  He had been romancing another man’s wife in her bedroom 
when, upon hearing the husband return home, jumped out the window without his clothes and took off down the street.  
On his way he met another man, also naked, who handed him a woman’s purse and went on his way.  The defendant was 
left trying to explain the misunderstanding to the police. Sean Elder, Randy Newman, SALON (Aug. 24, 1999), 
http://www.salon.com/people/bc/1999/08/24/newman. 
69 See Honorable Donald E. Shelton, The ‘CSI Effect’: Does It Really Exist?, 259 NAT’L INST. JUST.  J. 1 
(2008);  see also Honorable Donald E. Shelton et al., Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific 
Evidence: Does the ‘CSI Effect Exist? 9 VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 331 (2006) (containing the empirical data used in 
preceding article); Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and 
Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006) (arguing that the CSI effect is just as likely to make jurors convict defendants as it is 
likely to make jurors acquit them). 
70 Catherine Tsai, Prosecutor: DNA Clears JonBenet Ramsey’s Family, BREITBART, (July 9, 2008,) 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D91QJ8SO1&show_article=1. 
71 Edwin Zedlewski & Mary B. Murphy, DNA Analysis for “Minor” Crimes: A Major Benefit for Law 
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that anecdotal law enforcement reporting found that law enforcement officers doubled their arrest 
rates when DNA evidence was collected at property crime scenes and that DNA evidence was 
twice as effective at identifying suspects in property crimes as fingerprint evidence.72 
The larger point is that in many cases, Professor Smith’s concern that “the innocent will 
become the enemy of everyone else at every stage” is a development that is not the fault of 
innocence work.73  It is simply a fact of the inevitability of scientific advancement and that 
advancement’s intrusion into popular culture.  It is also true that for virtually every 
“advancement” toward “the perfect,” there are collateral consequences that arguably inure 
unintended recipients to the benefit.  This is true of DNA technology.  Even though the use of 
DNA has, as Professor Smith says, created a variety of “gold standard” proof, it has also 
simultaneously exposed the bogus credentials of formerly accepted fields of forensic science, like 
fingerprint, bite mark, and arson.74  This phenomenon was fully documented in a 2010 National 
Academies of Science Report75 that exhaustively reviewed the bona fides of several forensic 
disciplines and, with the exception of the science of DNA, found that many lacked basic 
foundational principles qualifying them as valid forensic sciences.76  Even DNA evidence is 
subject to considered review because, as one of the leading scholars in this area Erin Murphy77 
has documented, the science is not immune to some of the same vagaries that compromised softer 
or pseudo-science disciplines.78 
The broadest of Professor Smith’s concerns regarding the pitfalls of innocence becoming 
the currency of criminal justice reform is her worry that such efforts will have deleterious effects 
on criminal defendants generally.  She has plenty of support for that concern.  In 2005 in The 
Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital 
Punishment Law and Advocacy,79 Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker suggest that criminal 
justice reformist movements including the innocence movement may, in their efforts to ensure 
meaningful constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants, inadvertently cause a narrowing of 
those protections.80 
                                                          
Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST., 2 (2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000253.pdf. 
72 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DNA  & PROPERTY CRIMES (2010). 
73 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 324.  Professor Smith also complains that the 
defendant with the factual innocence claim “throws every other defendant under the bus.”  Id.  At the risk of being snide, 
throwing people under the bus is a time-tested criminal defense tactic that has nothing to do with the rise of innocence 
projects. 
74 Mark Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, 91 A.B.A.J. 48, 48-53 (July 2005). 
75 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009). 
76 Id. at 4, 14. The report also proposes the creation of a federally sponsored entity that would set and 
enforce national standards for forensic sciences.  Id. at 16-21. 
77 Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  Before she became a professor, Murphy was a 
public defender in Washington, D.C. 
78 Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of 
Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV.  721 (2007); see also FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION (John Buckleton et 
al. eds., 2005); Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2010); Yun 
S. Song et al., Average Probability that a “Cold Hit” in a DNA Database Search Results in an Erroneous Attribution, 54 
J. FORENSIC SCI. 22 (2009). 
79 Streiker & Streiker, supra note 5, at 587. 
80 Interestingly, advances in DNA technology, including the ability of law enforcement agencies to access 
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Among other data, the Steikers’ article traces the years-long broad and varied backlash 
against the Warren Court’s expansion of federal constitutional protections for state criminal 
defendants.  Specifically, the later Burger and Rehnquist Courts reacted by crafting “rules of 
constitutional adjudication” that focused “on truth-seeking rather than vindication of 
constitutional rights per se.”81  The result, according to them, was that there was a substantial 
impact on “constitutional standards regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 
duties to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . .”82  This development was followed by a series of 
decisions that narrowed the relief available through federal habeas corpus.83  Congress followed 
suit in 1996 by amending the federal habeas statute in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).84  The combined result was a movement away from the Warren 
Court’s view that the criminal process was “an appropriate venue for addressing claims of police 
and prosecutorial misconduct or for promoting abstract values (such as dignity, fairness, or 
equality)” and toward “a larger movement to make accurate determination of guilt or innocence 
the paramount or exclusive value in constitutional criminal procedure.”85 
I readily concede that there has been a reaction against the Warren Court’s efforts to 
extend the availability of federal rights to state criminal defendants, but unlike earlier innocence-
oriented cases that were used as grist for those reforms, the volume and frequency of post-
conviction DNA exonerations in recent years has irrevocably changed the landscape of the 
argument.  When The Seduction of Innocence was published in 2005, for example, there had been 
one hundred and fifty-eight post-conviction DNA exonerations.86  At the time of this writing there 
have now been two hundred and seventy-four; new exonerations are documented every week. 87  
These numbers do not include non-DNA post-conviction exonerations, many of which provide 
even more compelling evidence of the pathologies that infect our justice system. 
Additionally, in a place like Mississippi, where I work, one could fairly claim that there 
has been no backlash because the very conception presupposes that there is something tangible to 
                                                          
data bases of collected DNA profiles, has given rise to civil rights issues that were not contemplated until recently.  The 
contours of this area of the law are still being decided, as are the constantly evolving forensic uses of DNA technology.  
See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 611 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that “42 U.S.C. § 14135a, and its 
accompanying regulations, requiring a charged defendant to submit a DNA sample for analysis and inclusion in CODIS 
without independent suspicion or a warrant unreasonably intrudes on such defendant’s expectation of privacy and is 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution”).  The Third Circuit scheduled an en banc hearing 
to decide the issue.  Shannon P. Duffy, En Banc 3rd Circuit Set to Hear DNA Samples Case, LAW.COM, (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202473906320.  The case was argued in February of 2011. 
81 Streiker & Streiker, supra note 6, at 609. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 609-11 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (constricting petitioners’ ability to 
overcome non-compliance with state post-conviction procedure); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (narrowing 
petitioners’ ability to bring previously un-presented post-convictions claims and applying “cause and prejudice” standard 
to new claims not presented in previous petition); Kuhliman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (narrowing petitioners’ ability 
to re-bring claims in successor petitions)). 
84 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
85 Streiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 612. 
86 Id.; CHRISTOPHER REINHART, CT. OFF. OF LEG. RESEARCH, EXONERATIONS (2005) (“According to the 
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), as of February 28, 2005, there have been 119 exonerations of death row 
inmates in 25 states since 1973.”). 
87 Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject. 
org/ Content/ Facts _on_ PostConviction _DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
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backlash against.  The sad fact of the matter is that in a regional criminal justice system, as 
Douglas Blackmon documents in Slavery By Another Name, that for decades was predicated on 
“[s]wift, uncomplicated adjudication” to ensure that African Americans were essentially re-
enslaved, the legacy of that system is still present.88  Even though Mississippi locks up more of its 
citizens per capita than any state other than Louisiana, it has no statewide public defender system.  
A recent study indicated that 42% of felony cases in rural Quitman County, Mississippi were 
resolved by guilty plea on the day of arraignment.89  Even as late as 2007, the “innocence 
revolution” as Professor Smith and others refer to it, had not reached Mississippi.  Of the then just 
under 200 post-conviction DNA exonerations, none had occurred in Mississippi.  Though almost 
every other state in the nation had recognized the value of preserving DNA and creating legal 
mechanisms for prisoners to request post-conviction testing claims, Mississippi had not seen fit to 
address these accepted trends either legislatively or otherwise. 
Now, five years later, Mississippi has experienced twelve exonerations, one of which 
involved a prisoner who had been on death row.  Beginning in 2008, the Mississippi Legislature 
passed comprehensive DNA preservation and testing laws,90 one provision of which allows 
prisoners who pleaded guilty to nonetheless seek DNA testing in their cases.91  Not only is this 
provision not a feature of most state DNA testing statutes, some state courts have specifically held 
that prisoners who pleaded guilty are prohibited from requesting testing.92  Just last year four 
Mississippi prisoners were exonerated – one posthumously – after relying on this provision to 
seek DNA testing in their cases.  In one case, the defendants had confessed and then pleaded 
guilty in order to avoid the death penalty.  They had been incarcerated for close to three decades.93 
Similarly, in the last several years (and since the publication of the Steikers’ article in 
2005) innocence projects have been able to advocate successfully for significant legislative 
reform as well as other policy changes at various law enforcement or other municipal entities.94  
Because erroneous eyewitness identifications – or, more to the point, flawed identification 
procedures – have been implicated in such a significant portion of wrongful convictions, 
innocence projects have moved to pass sweeping reformist legislation that is aimed directly at 
correcting systemic problems.  Innocence projects have been successful in submitting and 
                                                          
88 DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 66 (2008) (exhaustively accounting the continuing de facto enslavement of 
black laborers in the South after Reconstruction). 
89 STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.  See also NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. 
FUND, INC., ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 17 (2003) (describing the high caseloads 
of contract defenders and resulting inadequate representation given to indigent defendants in Mississippi). 
90 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-49-1 (West 2010). 
91 Id. 
92 See People v. Byrdsong, 33 A.D.3d 175, 179-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), appeal denied, 7 N.Y.3d 900 
(2006) (holding that defendant was not entitled to post-conviction DNA testing because he had pled guilty); People v. 
Allen, 47 A.D.3d 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that because the ultimate judgment was based on defendant’s guilty 
plea, defendant was not entitled to post-conviction DNA testing). 
93 Campbell Robertson, 30 Years Later, Freedom in a Case With Tragedy for All Involved, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17exonerate.html. 
94 See, e.g., 81st Legislative Session, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT OF TEXAS, http://ipoftexas.org/index. 
php?action=8 1st-legislative-session (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
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advocating for the passage of eyewitness identification reform in eleven states95 and are working 
in almost every other state or jurisdictions within particular states to affect the same types of 
reform.  Projects have also worked to pass legislation aimed at obligating law enforcement 
agencies to record and/or videotape interrogations.96  In addition to these legislative measures, 
innocence project personnel have been working with state prosecutors’ associations and the ABA 
to craft and adopt Model Rule 3.8, which deals specifically with prosecutorial obligations, 
particularly when they arise in the context of an innocence case.97 On the federal level, Congress 
passed sweeping reform in 2004 with passage of the “Justice for All” Act, which provided for 
among other things, access to post-conviction DNA testing for federal prisoners, compensation 
for federal exonerees, funding initiatives to encourage states to implement meaningful DNA 
preservation and testing protocols, as well as baseline requirements for defense counsel 
competence in death penalty cases.98 
At first glance it may appear as though this reformist agenda begins and ends with 
“innocence” as its genesis and thereafter the distinctive marker of a valid claim for relief.  
However, the reforms mentioned above, many of which were passed by state legislatures, redound 
frequently to the benefit of criminal defendants who do not have a claim of innocence more than 
those that do.  But the other point is that, notwithstanding the passage of these reforms, there still 
exists a fundamental resistance to the meaning and worth of legitimate innocence claims by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  To argue now, as Professor Smith does, that the pursuit of innocence cases 
and the reforms that follow may result in a damaging litmus test for most criminally accused 
seems in this current atmosphere more than slightly precious.  Nothing to date seems to have 
moved the bloc of the Court that is averse to the realities of the criminal justice system’s 
institutionalized inequities.  Not even its own tragic mistakes.  Take for example the seminal case 
of Arizona v. Youngblood.99 
In 1983 a ten year-old boy was abducted from a Pima County, Arizona carnival and 
repeatedly sodomized.  Hospital personnel collected evidence and completed a rape kit provided 
by Tucson law enforcement.  Thereafter, however, the material was not tested completely and 
some of the evidence was improperly stored causing it to degrade.  Youngblood was identified by 
the victim and convicted at trial.  When he challenged law enforcement’s handling of the evidence 
that he claimed would have exonerated him, the Court held that routine or negligent destruction 
was of no constitutional import and that  “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the 
part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of 
                                                          
95 This list of states includes: Georgia (H.R. Res. 352, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007) (creating 
the House Study Committee on Eyewitness Identification Procedures)); Illinois (725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17A (West 
2010)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506 (West 2010)); New Jersey (JOHN J. FARMER, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2001), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NJ_eyewitness.pdf); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 
2010)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2010)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1-16 (West 
2010)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 182 (West 2010)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.02 (West 2010)); 
West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-1, 1-3 (West 2010)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50 (West 2011)). 
96 See generally False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/False-Confessions.php (last visited December 29, 2010) (providing jurisdictions that 
have undertaken reform measures to record interrogations). 
97 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pic/3_8.pdf. 
98 See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004). 
99 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988) (holding that without a showing of bad faith there was no 
denial of due process to criminal defendants when law enforcement failed to preserve evidence). 
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due process of law.”100  In a vigorous dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote that the provision of due 
process must surely require something more than simply avoiding bad faith action, noting wryly 
that a failure of justice is not mitigated simply because the police were inept but otherwise 
uncorrupted.101  Youngblood served his sentence and was released but re-imprisoned in 1999 for 
failing to register as a sex offender.  In 2000, more advanced DNA technology allowed the 
degraded semen sample to be tested.  The results exonerated Youngblood and implicated the real 
perpetrator, who was subsequently convicted and sentenced to twenty-four years.  Youngblood is 
still the law of the land. 
Among the lessons that Youngblood is able to teach is that recent efforts designed to 
narrow the ability for prisoners to gain relief through post-conviction claims – whether they be 
through states’ efforts to narrow or through federal statues like AEDPA – have resulted in 
creating a series of impediments that have, whatever else their proponents may claim, prohibited 
just claims from being adjudicated.  These types of claims are certainly not limited to clients with 
claims of innocence, and despite what some have argued about innocence projects “diluting” the 
“core conception of innocence,” the reality is much more nuanced than that.102  Innocence cases 
like Youngblood, if they have done anything, have sharpened the attention that ought to be paid to 
a spectrum of post-conviction statutory schemes that are failing. 
Yet, despite both the rhetorical and empirical power of this data, the Supreme Court 
remains intractable.  When, in 2009, the Court had another opportunity to consider argument 
regarding access to post-conviction DNA testing – this time in Osborne where the biological 
material had been carefully preserved – the Court again denied access by relying on the specious 
and empirically unsupported view that inmates, armed with the constitutional right to seek DNA 
testing would “game” the system and wreak havoc if  “given a never-before-recognized 
constitutional right to rummage through the state’s genetic-evidence locker.”103 “Gaming” the 
system is indeed a legitimate worry, though it is the Supreme Court that is the malefactor and 
appears unlikely to have the temerity to admit that in the near future.  It has been due in large part 
to innocence work that the Court’s hypocrisy has been exposed.  While the Court’s unwillingness 
to take corrective action should be of significant concern, least among them it seems to me is the 
worry that continued innocence reform efforts might result in a backlash. 
IV. THE ASCENDENCY OF INNOCENCE PROJECTS IN LAW SCHOOL CLINICAL 
PROGRAMS 
Professor Smith, a long-time clinical professor – and as importantly for this portion of 
her article, an articulate and thoughtful proponent of clinical legal education104 – cites several 
worries about the growing prevalence of innocence projects as a clinical education option at law 
schools.105  Her worries boil down to two related concerns: (1) that law students who participate 
                                                          
100 Id. at 58. 
101 Id. at 66-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
102 See, e.g., Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N. C. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2011). 
103 Dist. Atty’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2328 (2009). 
104 See generally Smith, Difference in Criminal Defense, supra note 48 (discussing how the difference 
between civil and criminal cases creates a difference in legal ethics).  See also Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 16 
(discussing the craft in high volume public defense and attributes of public defenders). 
105 Other Projects Around the World, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Other-
Projects.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (listing innocence projects at universities around the world). 
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in innocence clinics will fail to learn the specific skill set and empathic qualities normally 
associated with good defense work, and, (2) that it comes close to being unconscionable to start 
an innocence clinic that provides a very select service to a very select set of clients when there are 
so many other, deserving clients, both those facing criminal charges and those who have civil 
legal needs, who have no access at all to legal counsel.106 
If the available statistics mean anything, then Professor Smith’s appears to have no need 
to worry.  Of the 131 schools that reported to the Center for Applied Legal Education’s recent 
survey on applied legal education, nineteen reported having innocence clinics (out of a total of 
809 clinics, of which 63 were criminal defense clinics.)107  Since that time, the Innocence 
Network has received four applications from clinic-based innocence projects.  Each was granted 
membership; none replaced a pre-existing criminal defense clinic.  In addition, for many law 
schools, creating a new clinic, particularly one that requires frequent and close supervision like 
criminal defense clinics, is simply not a feasible proposition.  To begin, such clinics are quite 
expensive to start and to maintain.108  Even where expenses are not an issue, many schools are not 
ideally situated to provide the sort of atmosphere conducive to starting such clinics. And as much 
as we might not like to admit it, there are also political realities both in and out of law schools’ 
control that can make maintaining existing clinics hard enough, not to mention establishing new 
ones.109 
Most central to Professor Smith’s concern about the ascendency of innocence clinics is 
her belief that students who participate in them are not exposed to the core values that successful 
guilty projects offer to their students, namely the experience that students who represent “guilty” 
clients undergo when they realize their clients are not so very different, ultimately, from 
                                                          
106 For information regarding the current crisis in statewide indigent criminal defense, see, for example, THE 
SPANGENBERG GROUP, ABA INFORMATION PROGRAM, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: 2005 (2005), 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/statewideinddefsystems2005.pdf (providing state-
by-state information on existing public defender programs and oversight).  For the same issues regarding the crises in civil 
representation, see, for example, William Glaberson, Top New York Judge Urges Greater Legal Rights for the Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/nyregion/04court.html (discussing a judge’s need for lawyers 
representing indigents in civil cases); Carol J. Williams, California Gives the Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
17, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-civil-gideon17 (discussing a new law under which the state will 
provide lawyers in key civil cases, such as those dealing with eviction and domestic abuse, and explaining that advocates 
think underprivileged litigants will get a better shot at justice); Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§68650 (West 2009) (establishing funding for a pilot project that will provide indigents a lawyer in certain civil cases). 
107 David A. Santacroce & Robert R. Kuehn, Report on the 2007-2008 Survey, Center for the Study of 
Applied Legal Education, http://www.csale.org/files/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf (providing quantitative information 
on U.S. law school clinics and clinic educators). 
108 See Melissa L. Breger & Theresa A. Hughes, Advancing the Future of Family Violence Law Pedagogy: 
The Founding of a Law School Clinic, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 167 (2007).  See generally Donald N. Duquette, 
Developing a Child Advocacy Clinic: A Law School Clinical Legal Education Opportunity, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 
(1997). 
109 For a good discussion of the political implications that sometimes arise with law school clinics, see 
generally, David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 
209 (2003).  For a discussion of the particular problems encountered by Tulane Law School Environmental Clinic see 
Peter Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
University of Maryland law school clinics have also come under political scrutiny.  See Karen Sloan, Partial Victory for 
Law Clinic in Fight with Legislature, THE NAT’L L. J., April 5, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ. 
jsp?id=1202447502486&slreturn=1; Karen Sloan, Independence of Maryland Law School Clinic Is Challenged by 
Lawmakers, THE NAT’L L. J., March 29, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202447072923. 
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themselves.  “This is a transformative revelation for some,” she writes, and, “[y]ou cannot teach 
this generosity of spirit or lack of judgment when you represent only factually innocent people 
who have been wronged by the system.  It is too easy to identify with an innocent person.”110 
I could not disagree more.  To begin with, I don’t think that it’s “too easy” to identify 
with the innocence clients whom I have represented.111  In fact, I think it’s extraordinarily 
difficult.  I should probably pause and admit that I have never felt that it was particularly easy for 
me to identify with the hundreds of “guilty” clients I represented when I was a public defender 
either.  I suppose I need to admit that it’s possible that the lessons I was supposed to have learned 
as a clinical student never took.  In my case, my “transformative experience,” such as it was, had 
more to do with my continual amazement by just how different my life was from most of my 
clients’.  Unlike the “there but for the grace of God go I” realization, I was so far removed from 
the life experiences of my clients that we may have been from different planets.  And this in 
Washington, D.C., a relatively provincial city,112 where my clients and I were sometimes only 
physically separated by a block or two. 
I also take issue with her claim from a much more practical pedagogical standpoint.  
Identifying, investigating and litigating claims of innocence contain all of the base ingredients for 
the type of experience Professor Smith claims as the purview of “guilty projects.”  First of all, 
innocent clients do not generally spring, fully formed, like a post-conviction Aphrodite out of 
some state’s department of corrections database.  All of the cases that we agree to consider are 
post-conviction cases.  To read the appellate opinions on these cases is to read a record that is 
replete with a version of guilt.  From a purely factual perspective, the trial record is generally no 
better.  What interests us is a rape kit that may never have been submitted for testing in a 
“stranger on stranger” sexual assault, or a recanting witness who had been a co-defendant who 
had gotten a deal.  Those facts standing alone do not mean by any stretch that the person is 
innocent – only that there exist hallmarks of possible innocence in a case that may or may not turn 
out to be – after significant work – a viable case.  Until that point, though, students are working 
on a “guilty” person’s case.113 
Secondly, Professor Smith writes that the case-screening process by which many 
innocence projects choose cases to work on amounts to a “rationing” of access to justice because 
                                                          
110 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 326.  For a discussion of this phenomenon, see 
also Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 16, at 1203, 1251-59 (2004); Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 
CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 302-04 (2001) (discussing the process of promoting a desire for justice work in law students); Jane 
Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality,” 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing how to teach 
clinical legal students values associated with promoting justice); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult 
Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 51-52 (1995) 
(discussing the role of teachers in law clinics in promoting social justice learning). 
111 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 326 n.75.  Smith cites to a comment made by an 
innocence practitioner in support of her position. See Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the 
Role of Innocence Projects in Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 264 (2006) (arguing that Innocence 
Project students “gain the perspective of those citizens who have been . . . banished from our communities . . . [and] come 
to see the humanity of individuals convicted of the most heinous crimes”, and then adds this editorial note: “But note that 
these are innocent people convicted of heinous crimes and banished.”) 
112 In his Washington based novel of manners, The Last of the Southern Girls, Willie Morris wrote that 
about the town that “[i]t had all the illusions of a large city, compounded by the sources and appurtenances of national 
authority, which gave it its character.  Yet strip off these layers and there, for any outsider to see, lay the quintessential 
American small town.”  WILLIE MORRIS, THE LAST OF THE SOUTHERN GIRLS 3 (1973). 
113 See generally, Findley, supra note 111, at 264. 
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it emphasizes that some clients are more deserving than others, an exercise that is at odds with 
what she argues new lawyers should be learning.114  In virtually every innocence clinic with 
which I’m familiar, the screening process takes place within a very explicit context.  In my clinic, 
students do not interact with a live case until they have attended several initial classes, all of 
which are devoted to a discussion of what I refer to as the “ethos” of criminal defense work.  We 
read several articles and have (usually) vigorous discussions about what it means to be a criminal 
defense attorney.  One of the goals of the discussion is for the students to realize that one of the 
foremost skills that a defense lawyer can bring to bear on the client’s case is the ability not to 
stand in judgment.115  My students, like those in criminal defense clinics in which I have taught, 
struggle to find their comfort zone, but none take issue with the basic precepts of this claim or any 
others about what is required to zealously defend a client.  By the time they are ready to be 
introduced to the cases we are working on as innocence practitioners they are very much aware of 
the fact that they are, in essence, being judgmental; the irony is not lost on them. 
And then they are introduced to their cases.  Or more accurately the train wrecks that 
pass as cases handled by lawyers who have made the rationing of justice their daily bread and 
butter.  In case after case on which students work, lawyers have routinely failed to provide even 
the most basic required services.  What engages the students is exactly what Professor Smith says 
elsewhere in her scholarship is the true import of legal clinics: the teaching and valuing of craft.116  
For the students handling innocence cases, the fact that the client may be innocent is, ultimately, 
of little consequence – in the same way that actual innocence is of little practical legal 
consequence to a defense attorney who is facing a trial.  What outrages them is not that an 
innocent person was locked up unjustly – that outrage is, for them, sui generis.  What these soon-
to-be lawyers are engaged by are the causes of the injustice.  When they see defense lawyers 
waiving opening statements, conducting an entire trial without an articulable defense theory, 
inculpating their clients during an unpracticed cross examination, they are outraged.117  This is not 
the profession that they signed up for; it is my hope that wherever they end up, in whatever type 
of practice, they will not countenance it.  They have become, in other words, ready for justice.118 
V. CONCLUSION 
After a lengthy meeting among the defense attorneys in the Louisiana murder case, we 
decided on a strategy: rather than dealing at arm’s length with the prosecution in a case where we 
felt like we had a tactical advantage, we would capitalize on our position, take advantage of the 
growing recognition that convicting the innocent was a not uncommon reality, and present to the 
prosecution almost all of the additional exculpatory evidence that defense investigators had 
gathered over the years.  It was an unorthodox approach.  On the one hand it took the best of 
                                                          
114 Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, supra note 2, at 326. 
115 See Smith, Defending, supra note 16, at 928 ( “[The right to counsel] also makes plain one of the most 
important things a defense lawyer can offer a client accused of a terrible crime: suspension of judgment.”). 
116 See Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 16, at 1251-59 (2004) ( “[A] central part of the craft of 
defending is pushing the criminal justice system to step up . . . . We are the lone voice in the courtroom urging that the 
right thing be done--not necessarily the easy thing, but the right thing--as a matter of law and as a matter of humanity. At 
the very least, we make sure an injustice does not go unnoticed.”). 
117 See generally, Findley, supra note 111. 
118 See generally Aiken, supra note 110 (discussing the developmental process of teaching clinical law 
students how to be ready to do justice work). 
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good, smart – zealous – defense lawyering, and married it to a certain type of calculated risk that 
derived in part from our confidence in ourselves as a defense team and our unwavering 
commitment to our clients’ innocence.  One might just say that we were arrogant and that we 
were using innocence as the currency in our negotiations. 
It is also worth noting that all of the lawyers were either the products of robust criminal 
defense clinical programs or adherents to the model of zealous, client-centered representation that 
they claim as their hallmarks.  We were also at that moment in time representing “guilty” clients.  
Though it is true that they were also factually innocent, it was also true that under the most 
serious of the circumstances our clients faced, the distinction was a purely semantic one.  We had 
no DNA to test; no faulty eyewitness identification to rely on; no confession to claim was false.  
We were ready to proceed on the case the old-fashioned way: by trying the hell out of it. 
My client had been out of jail on bond during his first trial.  When he received word that 
the jury had returned with its verdict, he fled.  He eventually turned himself in, and at his 
sentencing, repeatedly tried to tell the court and anyone else who would listen that he and his co-
defendants were innocent.  No one seemed to care.  Not his defense attorney, who had engaged in 
egregious misconduct, nor the prosecutors who had failed to divulge exculpatory evidence, based 
much of their case on a cooperator, and felt confident about the verdict.  The only person who was 
moved to action was the judge.  He ordered that my client’s mouth be taped shut. 
Because, in his words, he wasn’t prepared “to go out like that,” my client became an 
exercise fanatic in the hope that he might turn an un-survivable sentence into a survivable one.  
He logged thousands of miles running in place in his jail cell before any of us could find it in 
ourselves to stop and listen long enough to what he had been trying to say about his case and 
about a system that condoned it. 
In September of 2010 the district attorney’s office dismissed the indictment against all of 
our clients. 
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